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Question 
Do non-partisan elections as part of political decentralisation improve performance of local 
government? 
• What is the international evidence-base on non-partisan elections and how they improve 
performance of local government over partisan elections? 
• Where are country examples of decentralisation policies being introduced which shifted 
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3. Examples of non-partisan elections at the sub-national sphere of government 
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1. Summary  
This rapid review focusses on whether there is international evidence on the role of non-partisan 
elections as a form of decentralised local government that improves performance of local 
government. The review provides examples of this from Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.  
The literature for this review is from a variety of sources, including published journal articles and 
academic theses as well as grey sources that include published reports and online literature. 
There was a dearth of literature on non-partisan elections and how they improve performance at 
the local government level. The shortage of current literature on this topic necessitated the use of 
some older published papers as key sources.  Comments from experts in the field of local 
government and decentralisation as well as African elections were therefore also solicited. 
Unsurprisingly, because of the shortage of examples on non-partisan elections and 
decentralisation, a gap in evaluation studies exploring the impact of non-partisan elections at the 
local government level is a further observation. This subject area in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
other developing parts of the world.  
The following key observations emerge from this review: 
• There are two reported examples in Sub-Saharan Africa of non-partisan elections that 
delink candidates from political parties during election campaigns. This finding was 
supported through the opinions solicited from experts on African elections and local 
government (see: Cheeseman, 2021, Fakir 2021, De Visser 2021); 
• The use of non-partisan elections to improve performance and democratic accountability 
at the level of government is not common. For example, in southern Africa all local 
elections at the sub-national sphere follow the partisan model (Hartmann, 2004); 
• No examples were found where countries shifted from partisan to non-partisan elections 
at the local government level; and  
• Decentralisation policies have the effect of democratising and transferring power and 
therefore few central governments implement it fully. In Africa decentralisation is 
favoured because it is often used as a cover for central control. Many post-colonial 
leaders in Africa continue to favour centralised government under the guise of 
decentralisation.  These preferences emanated from their experiences under colonisation 
where power was maintained by colonial administrations through institutions such as 
traditional leadership (Makara, 2017; Lechler and McNamee, 2016). 
A review of the literature on non-partisan elections at the local government level came across 
three examples where this occurred. These countries were: Ghana, Uganda and Bangladesh. 
Although South Africa holds partisan elections at the sub-national sphere, the election of ward 
committee members and ward councillors, is on a non-partisan basis and therefore, the ward 
committee system in South Africa, is included as an example of a non-partisan election process 
in the review. 
A review of the evidence from these four countries highlighted the following key insights: 
Ghana. 
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• Key structures of local government in Ghana are district assemblies. District assemblies 
arose from the system of government created under President Rawlings after a military 
coup in the 1980s. The coup resulted in the Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC) coming to power and the implementation of a populist agenda (Crook, 1994). 
• District assemblies were based on the idea of populist direct democracy, involving all 
citizens. District assemblies were established by law as non-partisan local governance 
structures (Crook, 1994). 
• With the advent of multiparty democracy in Ghana in 1992, the system of election of non-
partisan district assembly members continued (Crook, 1994). 
• In reality, district assemblies are partisan entities because the President appoints district 
chief executives and a third of district assembly members. The remaining district 
assembly members not appointed by the president are also linked to the ruling party 
(Razin, 2000). 
• Decentralisation is used as a means of ruling party control by co-opting local actors, 
through offering them a role in local government (Natalini, 2010). 
• Informal ties to the ruling party also bind district assembly members to the ruling party 
and weaken the independent non-partisan nature of assembly members. Such informal 
ties include ethnic bonds between the ruling party and elected district assembly members 
(Adamtey, 2014).  
• Assembly members are unpaid but must still fund their own election campaigns. The 
shortage of resources at this level has led to claims that candidates secretly fund their 
campaigns through political parties and other influential people. This further undermines 
the claim that assembly members are non-partisan (Adamtey, 2014). 
• Although the local government system in Ghana is supposed to be bottom-up in its 
approach, by developing community plans from the unit committee level, the absence of 
funds at this level, means that development plans emanate from the top down, via the 
ruling party, through district assemblies (Natalini, 2010). 
Uganda:  
• In a similar fashion to Ghana, Uganda developed an idealized notion of the ‘African 
Community’ to support its populist non-partisan ideology of inclusive local community 
participation at the sub-national sphere (Crook, 1994). 
• When Yoweri Museveni came into power in 1986 under the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM), a ‘no-party’ system, also known as the ‘movement system’ of 
government was adopted (Ribot, 2002). 
• Under Uganda’s 1993 constitution, the no-party system was entrenched and it gave 
every citizen the right to run for elected leadership which was based on individual merit 
(Singiza, 2014). 
• In terms of Uganda’s 1993 constitution, district councils formed the basis of local 
government and political parties were prohibited from interfering with any functions of the 
movement political system. In reality, there was very little difference between the 
movement political system and the ruling party (Singiza, 2014). 
• After a referendum in 2005, Ugandans voted to adopt a multiparty system and the non-
partisan elections came to an end Singiza (2014). 
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• Since this system of local government was set up, the ruling party has dominated district 
councils overwhelmingly, winning the majority of district council seats in comparison to 
opposition parties (Singiza, 2014). 
Bangladesh: 
• Bangladesh is an example of a country that has moved from non-partisan local elections, 
that have been in place since the country’s independence, to partisan elections in an 
effort to strengthen democracy and accountability at the local level (Union Pradesh level) 
through political competition (Panday, 2019). 
• Under the former no-party system, political parties would become involved informally in 
supporting non-partisan candidates at the local level. However, when there was a 
leadership failure at this level, political parties did not fully accept responsibility for 
mistakes that were made by local elected leaders (Panday, 2019). 
• With the advent of partisan elections, there has been a deterioration in the service 
delivery system and corruption at the local level (Sarker and Nawaz, 2019). 
• Deterioration in local government performance emanated from local MPs selling 
nominations for local government candidates to less capable candidates in order to 
strengthen their base at the local level. This prevented more capable candidates from 
being nominated (Panday, 2019). 
• Another problem identified with partisan elections, was state capture by elites. Ruling 
party members with strong political support were favoured in senior government 
appointments at the local level. This affected service delivery because instead of 
responding to the needs of citizens, political factors came into play when deciding on the 
services to provide (Panday, 2019). 
The South African ward committee system: 
• Although South Africa’s local government system operates within a partisan framework, a 
non-partisan approach is used , at this grassroots level in the election of the ward 
committee members (Modise, 2017). 
• Ward committees link residents to municipal councils to promote democratic decision-
making at the community/ward level. A non-partisan approach is utilised. The election of 
ward committee members and councillors is based on the principle of appointing 
residents to ward committees on merit, rather than party affiliation (Modise, 2017). 
• In terms of the Municipal Structures Act (1998), ward committees have limited powers 
and are able only to advise and make recommendations to councillors on any matter 
affecting its ward (Smith and de Visser, 2009). 
• Although ward committees lack decision-making powers, they have the ability to deepen 
democracy at the local level if they are chaired by competent ward councillors and are 
not undermined by party political agendas and if they are supported by municipal 
councils institutionally and materially (Piper and Deacon, 2009). 
• In reality, ward committees are dominated by political parties rather than communities 
and are not supported materially or institutionally by local government administrations 
making them less effective in responding to local residents’ needs (Piper and Deacon, 
2009). 
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2. Decentralisation and non-partisan elections 
Post-colonial trends in local government organisation 
Razin (1998) points out that decentralisation was a governance approach used in many 
colonised countries to prolong colonial rule. For example, in Namibia, the utilisation of tribal 
forms of governance, such as tribal chiefs, was a strategy deployed by colonial powers to exert 
indirect control over the indigenous population. These traditional authority systems continue to 
hold enormous political, economic and social power in post-colonial societies today (Lechler and 
McNamee, 2016). Following independence, centralism in governance was the new governance 
model adopted in many newly independent states. This was in response to the negative 
perception towards local authority-structures that were seen as collaborators with colonial 
regimes. Centralised government was also adopted as a way of promoting unity and nation-
building. In addition, because of the socialist roots of early post-independence states, belief in 
centralised control was perceived as the best approach to implementing large-scale development 
projects (Razin, 1998). Centralisation of the state as a governance strategy failed in most African 
countries and promoted a one-party political culture and cronyism that undermined democracy 
(Makara, 2017). Following failures with a centralised approach to governance decentralisation 
has subsequently been widely adopted in African states as a governance approach to facilitate 
development and inclusive government involving local communities (Makara, 2017).   
Decentralisation is meant to facilitate development and accountability at the local level and a 
system that serves the needs and interests of citizens, incorporating citizen participation in local 
government decision-making. In this way decentralisation is meant to extend democracy to the 
local community level (Razin, 1998). However, Makara (2017) notes that decentralisation 
ironically is favoured by less democratic governments because such policies are used as cover 
to retain central control. As pointed out earlier, this was a strategy utilised by colonial 
administrations to maintain power. An important component of decentralisation at local 
government level is the ability of this sub-national sphere of government to make its own 
decisions and to have autonomy from the national level. Decentralisation tends to democratise 
and transfer power and therefore few central government actors want to implement it fully 
(Makara, 2017). Where it has been implemented more successfully (with local level autonomy), 
decentralisation has resulted in a local governance style that is inclusive and more responsive to 
the needs of local communities (Makara, 2017). 
Only a few countries have attempted decentralisation through adopting a non-partisan model in 
the election of representatives at the local level whereby candidates are delinked from political 
parties for the purposes of elections. For example, all countries in southern Africa hold partisan 
local elections but most of these countries allow independent candidates and local traditional 
leader participation (Hartmann, 2004). 
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Figure 1: Candidature provisions for local councils 
 
Source: Hartmann, 2004, p. 238, licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 
 
 
The next section highlights examples from developing countries where a non-partisan political 
model at the local government level has been used as part of a decentralised approach to 
governance.  
3. Examples of non-partisan elections at the sub-national 
sphere of government 
 
Ghana non-partisan local elections 
Ghana has had a turbulent political history marked by military takeovers. After independence and 
the creation of a one-party state under Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana experienced six different 
military regimes between 1966 and 1992. Notwithstanding these political changes, Ghana’s 
current model of decentralised local government has persisted since the 1980’s when it was 
introduced along with many other developing countries under a Structural Adjustment 
Programme, to reform the public sector (Zakaria, 2014).  
In Ghana governance at the local level is through district assemblies. These cover metropolitan 
and municipal entities (Zakaria, 2014). When President Rawlings was in power between 1982 
and 1992, he established a system of district assemblies based on the idea of community 
participation in local government and populist direct democracy (Crook, 1994). This system of 
local government is one of the few institutional structures that has survived since Ghana 
transitioned from a military takeover under the Provisional National Defense Council (PNDC) into 
a multi-party democracy in 1992 (Crook, 1994). Initially, it was expected that revolutionary 
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People’s Defense Committees (PDCs) would be set up automatically by communities. Every 
community member would be included in a PDC Committee of the Village, Area or Town Council, 
similar to the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda (discussed below). However, 
Crook (1994) notes that Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs), replaced the 
PDCs after Rawlings’ military takeover in 1984. CDRs were closely aligned with the PNDC and 
identified as Rawlings loyalists under tight control of the PNDC (Crook, 1994). 
District assemblies’ main purpose continues to be to encourage local-level participation (down to 
the level of villages and communities) in development. The ideology underpinning this system is 
to ‘give power to the people’ (Crook, 1994). The model was based on the ideal of the village 
assembly in which all adults could participate (Crook, 1994).  
Since a multi-party democracy was re-established with the passing of a new a constitution after 
1992, elections have been closely contested between two main parties, the NPP (New Patriotic 
Party) and the NDC (National Democratic Congress) (Nyarko, Antwi and Antwi-Boasiako, 2019). 
Bob-Milliar (2012) notes that political patronage forms the basis of the current two-party 
dominated political system in Ghana. Political parties attract supporters not on the grounds of 
different ideological platforms, but as a route to political patronage. Party activists expect to be 
rewarded for their support before the outcome of an election is even determined (Bob-Milliar, 
2012). This is unlike established traditional Western democracies, where supporters count on 
their parties to deliver on their campaign platforms after they have won elections (Bob-Milliar, 
2012). Nyarko Antwi and Antwi-Boasiako (2019) note that political patronage is evident in the 
appointment of officials and permeates every level in government. The president has extensive 
powers, written into the constitution, to make public appointments.  
District assemblies are by law ‘non-partisan’, in terms of which, neither the ruling party nor 
opposition parties are permitted to back candidates, through financial support or in political 
campaigns (Crook, 1994). In reality, this is not the case and members of district assemblies are 
partisan because of the way they are appointed and elected. Razin (2000) notes that the 
president has the power to appoint district chief executives, who head district assemblies. 
Although his nominations of district chief executives require confirmation of two thirds majority in 
district assemblies, his abilities to have his nominations appointed are strengthened by his power 
to directly appoint 30% of district assembly members1. In addition, besides the assembly 
members appointed by him, the balance of members elected to these assemblies are also linked 
to the ruling party. Ties to the ruling party of public officials at the local level are also evident in 
other ways. For example, the wages of local government officials are paid by the ruling party 
(Razin, 2000). Decentralisation is used as a means of ruling party control by co-opting local 
actors through offering them a role in the local government. For example, rural and urban elites 
are the one’s employed in local government (Natalini, 2010). Crook, (1994) also notes that 
although there is partial democratisation under decentralised local government in Ghana, this 
sub-national sphere of government is still accountable to the ruling party. 
Adamtey (2014) highlights that informal ties to the ruling party are powerful forces in diluting the 
non-partisan nature of district assemblies. The overlap between ethnic ties and political control is 
 
1 The balance of district assembly members is elected in a non-partisan way from the community level (Natalini, 
2010). 
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the main example of this. Control of state power has shifted between various ethnic groupings in 
Ghana. For example, during the Nkwame Nkrumah years, the southern Akan groups were the 
dominant ethnic grouping in political control, whereas latterly, in the PNDC period, it was the 
Ewe-based ethnic groupings that were in control.  For those in power, ethnic groupings are 
important in political decision-making and appointments because they promote trust and 
confidence in the belief that people in the same grouping will support and deliver for them 
(Adamtey, 2014). 
A factor that dilutes the intention of nonpartisan elections in Ghana, is tied to resource limitations 
for elections of district assembly members. Contesting district assembly elections at this level is 
expensive and potential candidates have to fund their own campaigns in spite of the fact that 
assembly members are unpaid. Assembly members claim that political parties and influential 
people, secretly fund candidates and this method was used by chief executives to unseat 
incumbent members for opposeing them (Adamtey, 2014). 
Decentralisation and the development impact in Ghana 
In practical implementation terms, bottom-up people’s participation in development has not been 
so successful in Ghana because of inadequate resources (Natalini, 2010). The grassroots 
planning process was meant to happen at the unit committee level. However, since members to 
the committees are not paid and are not always even elected or in place, district assemblies 
become the default level of government tasked with development planning including poverty 
reduction policies. District assemblies are directed by central government in this respect and 
therefore plans do not emanate from the ground up by the people, but from top down (Natalini, 
2010). 
Natalini (2010) and Crook (1994) both highlight the limitations of district assemblies in meeting 
citizens development needs at the local level. Crook (1994) notes that the size of wards which 
district assembly members represent can be large with population sizes of between 75,000 and 
250, 000. Population needs in such territories may be diverse with differences between rural and 
urban areas. Natalini (2010) notes that the idea that representatives of district assemblies are 
serving the needs of homogenous communities in the areas they are representing is a fallacy. 
The diverse needs of these territories and multiple ‘communities’ within them, increases the 
service delivery demands. Crook (1994) notes that assembly members may be pressured by 
district secretaries’ (the next level of government), to meet national level targets rather than first 
meeting the demands of communities at the local level. For example, district secretaries required 
assembly members to focus on meeting tax collection targets rather than focussing on local 
service delivery targets which would increase their popularity at the local level (Crook, 1994). 
Uganda non-partisan local elections 
Decentralisation in Uganda has its roots in violent political conflict since the country achieved 
independence from Britain in 1962. Decentralisation was a reaction to over centralisation of 
power between 1967 and 1986. This period of overcentralisation was marked by a decline in the 
rule of law, military government, civil wars and dictatorship. It was local communities that bore 
the brunt of this hardship and struggle for power over these two decades (Singiza, 2014). 
Political instability and violent takeovers over this period was experienced at the local level and 
citizens were subjected to an absence of basic and community services such as health care, 
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clean water supply and schools for their children (Singiza, 2014). When Yoweri Museveni came 
to power in 1986 under the National Resistance Movement that overthrew military dictator Idi 
Amen, a ‘no-party’ system (also known as the ‘movement system’) of governance was adopted 
as the approach to decentralisation and the model for governance to restore political stability and 
to promote unity following the war (Ribot, 2002).  
Crook (1994) notes that in Uganda, the National Resistance Movement (NRM), like Ghana’s 
PNDC regime developed an idealized notion of the ‘African Community’ to support their ideology 
of a non-partisan form of governance that would be based on inclusive local community 
participation.  After Museveni’s National Resistance Army came into power following the war, 
every Ugandan citizen was viewed as a member of the NRM, which was called a ‘movement’ 
rather than a political party and therefore every citizen was eligible to participate in elections for 
local community Resistance Councils. These were bodies at the base of the government 
structure which were used to elect the National Resistance Council in 1986. From 1987 onwards, 
the Resistance Councils became local government structures, indirectly appointing members up 
to the district level, whilst the National Resistance Council has become Parliament, elected on a 
no-party’ basis (Crook, 1994).  
In 1993 a new draft constitution was crafted after nationwide consultations (Uganda Electoral 
Commission2). In terms of the new Constitution of Uganda, district councils form the basis of 
local government and these structures had separate and distinct political and administrative 
powers from national government (Singiza, 2014). Makara (2000) argues that President 
Museveni's government was motivated to decentralise power in early 1990s because 
decentralisation was seen as an alternative to full political democratisation in Uganda.  
In terms of the constitution, Singiza (2014, p. 268) lists four key principles of the political 
movement system (no-party system): 
• Every citizen had the right to be involved in the decision making process; 
• Transparency in the governance system, whereby every decision taken had to be 
justified and explained to citizens; 
• Every citizen had the opportunity to access any leadership position;  
• Candidates were elected based on individual merit. 
In addition, the constitution prohibited political parties from performing any activities that would 
interfere with the Movement Political System. In reality, there was very little difference between 
the Movement Political System and the ruling party. Singiza (2014) argues that the Movement 
Political System was seen as a ‘rival’ to government, even-though there was very little difference 
between the NRM (as a movement) and the de facto one-party state. Non-partisan elections 
came to an end in 2005 when a referendum was held on the political system and Ugandans 
voted to adopt a system of multiparty governance (Ugandan Electoral Commission). However, 
this change was not genuine, but followed external pressures (including from the donor 
community) to change to a multiparty system (Singiza, 2014). Singiza (2014) notes that since the 
 
2 Source -Electoral Commission, date unknown 
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system of multiparty elections was implemented with the passing of The Political Parties and 
Organisations Act, 2005, the ruling party has dominated district councils overwhelmingly, winning 
large majorities of district council seats in contrast to opposition parties. 
Decentralisation and the development impact in Uganda 
In Uganda Francis and James (2003) highlight that decentralisation at the local government level 
is in name only. There is little citizen participation at this level in the context of ‘elite capture’ 
where decisions and resources are allocated to community members favoured by the ruling 
party. Francis and James (2003) note that decentralisation was adopted for ‘technocratic’ and 
‘patronage’ reasons. Technocratic reasons concerned the need to prioritse and set national 
development targets for example around poverty reduction. Whereas, patronage reasons utilised 
concepts of participatory planning, as a smokescreen in the context of limited resources and 
“state capture by the local elites”, in decision making. In this situation, participatory planning was 
limited to “ritualised performance with little meaningful citizens' involvement” (Francis and James, 
2003, p. 334). 
 Makara (2000) notes that decentralisation was implemented mainly to appease international 
donors and citizens. Singiza (2014) notes that although a multi-party system was adopted in 
2005, political pluralism is tolerated but not favoured in the election of district councils. A de facto 
one-party state remained the key characteristic of governance in Uganda and electoral outcomes 
of district councils indicate an overwhelming dominance of the ruling party as highlighted earlier. 
Decentralisation has also not improved service delivery and is leading to growing disillusionment 
among citizens with this approach to government (Manyak and Katono, 2010). Local government 
in Uganda is responsible for the provision of a range of services, including: education, health 
care through hospitals and health centres; water supply and the provision and maintenance of 
road infrastructure. Agricultural development (though the provision of agricultural extension 
services and poverty alleviation fall within the remit of local government responsibilities (Manyak 
and Katono, 2010). However, with the elimination of the G-tax poll (because of its unpopularity 
with citizens) which was a tax that all Ugandan adults were required to pay, even if they were not 
employed, local government revenue was slashed by some 85% (Manyak and Katono, 2010). 
Central government did not step in to replace the balance of lost revenue and this resulted in 
local government operations and services coming to a virtual standstill (Manyak and Katono, 
2010). Compounding the unsustainability of local government was the creation of new districts. 
This was undertaken to reduce conflicts by separating tribal and ethnic groups into districts with 
their own governments and to improve service delivery especially in marginalised rural areas 
(Manyak and Katono, 2010). However, the new districts are not economically viable and there is 
an added financial and administrative burden resulting from their establishment. Resources for 
their management are spread more thinly between new and old districts, reducing their 
effectiveness (Manyak and Katono, 2010). 
 
Bangladesh 
Bangladesh is an example of a country that changed from a non-partisan election system at the 
local level to partisan elections. This local government electoral reform marked the first time 
Bangladesh had undertaken such reform since independence (Sarker and Nawaz, 2019). The 
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adoption of this new policy was aimed to strengthen democracy and accountability at the local 
level through the introduction of political competition (Panday 2019). However, even when local 
elections were held with the non-partisan approach, political parties would become involved by 
informally supporting candidates. Under this system, political parties did not fully accept 
accountability for the mistakes that elected ‘non-partisan’ candidates made after election. For 
example, if they did something that was illegal. However, with partisan elections political parties 
would have to take responsibility and bear liabilities for nominated candidates (Panday, 2019). 
When the ruling coalition government led by Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) amended the 
election regulations to allow partisan elections at the level of Union Parishad (UP) (the lowest tier 
of the village local government system), various problems have been identified (Sarker and 
Nawaz, 2019). Problems concern a deterioration of service delivery and corruption at the local 
level. Panday notes that in the 2016 UP election, there were many instances where local MPs 
(Member of Parliament) would sell nominations to non-deserving less capable candidates, to 
strengthen their base at the local level. This denied more capable candidates from being 
nominated. State capture by elites was also another problem identified and this affected the 
quality of service- delivery (Panday, 2019). Ruling party leaders with strong political support were 
being favoured in senior appointments of government at the local level (for example mayoral 
appointments). Service delivery was affected because instead of responding to the needs and 
demands of citizens at the local level, political considerations came into play in deciding the 
services to provide (Panday, 2019). Sarker and Nowaz (2019) suggest that the ruling party 
should rethink electoral reform along political party lines, to reduce the incidence of buying and 
selling nominations and factional conflicts within political parties that result from this. 
4. An approach to promoting local democracy through the 
ward committee system in South Africa 
 
The South African ward committee system has attempted to respond directly to the local 
development needs of communities and to promote democratic decision-making at the 
community/ward level, through a decentralised approach. The election of ward committee 
members is based on the principle of appointing residents to ward committees on merit, rather 
than party affiliation (Modise, 2017).  In this system, ward committee members must be 
appointed in terms of their competence in relation to the scope of the work they perform in the 
ward committees rather than appointments based on party politics. Ward committee members 
are required to carry out their functions by focussing on the interests of people who live in the 
ward, rather than the political parties they may belong to (Modise, 2017). 
A ward is a defined area with distinctive boundaries located in a metropolitan area or municipality 
in South Africa and is the lowest level of local government administration3. Ward Committees can 
have up to 10 members and are supposed to represent a wide variety of community interests. 
Wards meet regularly under the chairperson who is a ward councillor. In South Africa, there are 
two types of local government councillors, viz: those councillors who are elected through 
 
3 Civics Academy. https://www.civicsacademy.co.za/video/role-ward-committee/ 
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Proportional Representation (PR) via party lists (they are called PR councillors), and are 
accountable to their political party and, ward councillors (Paradza, Mokwena and Richards, 
2010). Ward councillors are elected directly by residents living in the ward they are representing. 
Ward councillors are not elected on the party ticket, but rather through community nomination. 
Ward councillors must receive 50 signatures of support from local residents in the ward (de 
Visser interview, 2021). Ward councillors are also able to stand for ward councillor elections as 
independent candidates or as representatives of political parties (Hartmann, 2004). In terms of 
the Municipal Structures Act (1998), ward committees have limited powers and are able only to 
advise and make recommendations to the councillor on any matter affecting its ward (Smith and 
de Visser,2009). Piper and Deacon (2009) in their research conducted in the Msunduzi 
municipality in KwaZulu-Natal highlight that although ward committees lack decision-making 
powers, they have the ability to deepen democracy at the local level if they are chaired by 
competent ward councillors and are not undermined by party political agendas and if they are 
supported by municipal councils institutionally and materially (Piper and Deacon, 2009).  
The ward committee system has shown some limited success in encouraging citizen participation 
in decision making. Piper and Deacon (2009) note that in the case of the Msunduzi municipality, 
their research indicated that community members thought ward committees were a positive 
innovation and facilitated citizen involvement in council decision making at the municipal level. 
Ward councillors felt that their views carried more weight in council if they were supported by 
their ward committee. However, the Msunduzi case study highlighted that ward committees are 
often not implemented properly, and this affects their functions. They are dominated by 
councillors and political parties rather than by the community as a whole and are not supported 
adequately by municipal administrations to carry out their functions (Piper and Deacon, 2009). 
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